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1 Introduction
Due to the recent financial crisis during 2008-2009, there is a renewed interest in understanding
the role of asset bubbles in business cycles and the associated policy implications. Gal´ı (2014)
presents an elegant overlapping generations model with nominal rigidities to study the impact of
monetary policy on rational asset bubbles. He finds some intriguing results that are inconsistent
with conventional views. These results are summarized below:
• A stronger interest rate response to bubble fluctuations (i.e., a “leaning against the wind
policy”) may raise the volatility of asset prices and of their bubble component.
• The optimal monetary policy strikes a balance between stabilization of current aggregate
demand and the bubble. If the average size of the bubble is sufficiently large, the latter
motive will be dominant, making it optimal for the central bank to lower interest rates in the
face of a growing bubble.
In this paper we revisit Gal´ı’s analysis by extending his model to allow for serially correlated
bubble shocks. Our analysis complements his. We argue that his results are driven by his particular
choice of the equilibrium solution. In his model there are multiple steady states and multiple
equilibria. In particular, there is a continuum of stable bubbly steady states and a continuum of
unstable bubbly steady states. He focuses on a backward-looking sunspot solution around a stable
bubbly steady state. For this solution the value of a pre-existing asset bubble only responds to its
own innovations. In the absence of such innovations, the size of an old bubble is predetermined, and
an increase in the interest rate will raise its future size. By contrast we analyze the forward-looking
minimal state variable (MSV) solution around an unstable bubbly steady state. For this solution
the asset bubble responds to shocks on impact just like any asset prices. An increase in interest
rates dampens the asset bubble on impact. We find results that are consistent with conventional
views and are different from Gal´ı’s results mentioned above. In particular, the optimal policy calls
for a leaning-against-the-wind rule. Note that this result depends on the assumption of serially
correlated bubble shocks. If bubble shocks are serially uncorrelated, monetary policy would not
affect bubble volatility for the MSV solution.
All steady states and equilibria in Gal´ı’s model are consistent with rational expectations. Fol-
lowing the methodology surveyed by Evans and Honkapohja (1999, 2001), we use learning as a
selection device to select a particular steady state and a particular equilibrium.1 The idea is that
agents of the model do not initially have rational expectations and they instead form forecasts by
using some adaptive learning rules such as recursive least squares based on the data. The question
1See Bullard and Mitra (2002), Adam (2003), Woodford (2003), Duffy and Xiao (2007), Benhabib, Evans, and
Honkapohja (2012), Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Johannsen (2018), among others, for the application of learning to
select equilibrium in macroeconomic models.
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is whether the agents can learn a particular equilibrium or a particular steady state. Marcet and
Sargent (1989) and Evans and Honkapohja (1999, 2001) show that the notion of expectational
stability (E-stability) determines local convergence of real time recursive learning algorithms in a
wide variety of economic models.
We find that the sunspot equilibrium solution adopted by Gal´ı (2014) is not E-stable under his
optimal monetary policy rule, but the forward-looking MSV solution is E-stable. We also find that
the unstable bubbly steady state Pareto dominates the stable bubbly steady state. Moreover the
former steady state is E-stable, but the latter is not. Our results are analogous to those in Evans,
Honkapohja, and Marimon (2007, 2001). They show that the E-unstable high-inflation steady state
in a hyperinflation model has counterintuitive policy implications, while the E-stable low inflation
steady state has conventional implications.
2 Solving Gal´ı’s Model
We first summarize Gal´ı’s (2014) model and refer the reader to his paper for detailed economic
interpretations. We extend his model by allowing for persistent bubble shocks. We then solve for
all equilibria and select equilibrium using a learning device.
2.1 Setup
The model economy consists of overlapping generations of agents, firms, and a central bank. Each
agent lives for two periods and an agent born in period t derives utility according to logC1,t +
βEt [logC2,t+1] , where C1,t =
(∫
1
0
C1,t (i)
ǫ−1
ǫ
) ǫ
ǫ−1
and C2,t+1 =
(∫
1
0
C2,t+1 (i)
ǫ−1
ǫ
) ǫ
ǫ−1
are consump-
tion bundles and ǫ > 1. Each young agent is endowed with one unit of labor and supplies it to
firms inelastically. Normalize the size of each cohort to unity.
Each young agent is endowed with δ ∈ (0, 1) units of an intrinsically useless bubble asset. The
bubble asset can be traded in an asset market. Each period a fraction δ of each vintage of bubble
assets loses its value so that the total amount of bubble assets outstanding remains constant and
equal to one. This modeling allows a new bubble to be created once an old bubble bursts, as in
Martin and Ventura (2012), Wang and Wen (2012), and Miao, Wang, and Xu (2015).
An agent born in period t chooses differentiated consumption goods C1,t (i) and C2,t+1 (i), bond
holdings ZMt , and holdings Z
B
t|t−k of bubble asset introduced in period t − k to maximize utility
subject to the following budget constraints
∫
1
0
Pt (i)C1,t (i)
Pt
di+
ZMt
Pt
+
∞∑
k=0
QBt|t−kZ
B
t|t−k =Wt + δQ
B
t|t, (1)
∫
1
0
Pt+1 (i)C2,t+1 (i)
Pt+1
di = Dt+1 +
ZMt (1 + it)
Pt+1
+ (1− δ)
∞∑
k=0
QBt+1|t−kZ
B
t|t−k,
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where Pt =
(∫
1
0
Pt (i)
1−ǫ di
) 1
1−ǫ
is the consumption price index, Wt is the real wage, it is the
nominal interest rate, Dt+1 is firm dividends, and Q
B
t|t−k is the period-t real price of the bubble
asset introduced in period t− k. Define the gross real interest rate as
Rt = (1 + it)Et
1
Πt+1
. (2)
Each agent owns a firm that produces a differentiated product Yt (i) using labor input Nt (i)
according to the technology Yt (i) = Nt (i). Each firm is monopolistically competitive and sets price
P ∗t one period in a advance, generating nominal rigidities. It solves the following problem
max
P ∗t
Et−1
[
βC1,t−1
C2,t
Yt (i)
(
P ∗t
Pt
−Wt
)]
subject to the demand schedule Yt (i) = (P
∗
t /Pt)
−ǫ Ct, where Ct = C1,t + C2,t. In a symmetric
equilibrium we have
0 = Et−1
[
βC1,t−1
C2,t
(1−MWt)
]
, (3)
where M = ǫ/ (ǫ− 1) denotes the markup.
The labor and goods markets clearing implies
C1,t + C2,t = 1, (4)
Dt +Wt = 1. (5)
Asset market clearing requires ZMt = 0 and Z
B
t|t−k = δ (1− δ)
k . Define the aggregate bubble index
Qt and the old bubble index Bt as
Qt = δ
∞∑
k=0
(1− δ)kQBt|t−k, Bt = δ
∞∑
k=1
(1− δ)kQBt|t−k.
Let Ut = δQ
B
t|t denote the size of new bubbles. Then by definition and the agent’s bubble asset
choice condition,
Qt = Bt + Ut, (6)
Bt + Ut = βEt
[
C1,t
C2,t+1
Bt+1
]
. (7)
The consumption Euler equation gives
1 = β (1 + it)Et
[
C1,t
C2,t+1
1
Πt+1
]
. (8)
The budget constraint (1) and the market-clearing conditions imply
C1,t +Qt =Wt + Ut. (9)
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To close the model, the central bank sets the nominal interest rate according to a feedback rule,
which may respond to asset bubbles,
ln (1 + it) = lnR+ φπ ln
(
Πt
Π
)
+ φb ln
(
Qt
Q
)
+ lnEtΠt+1, (10)
where φπ > 0, Πt = Pt/Pt−1 denotes gross inflation, and a variable without time subscript denotes
its steady-state value. The central questions are how monetary policy affects asset bubbles and
whether monetary policy should respond to asset bubbles.
The equilibrium system consists of eight equations (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), and (10)
for nine stochastic processes {C1,t} , {C2,t} , {Dt} , {Wt} , {Πt} , {it} , {Qt} , {Bt} , and {Ut} . Since
there are eight equilibrium conditions for nine variables, the equilibrium system cannot determine
the size of the old bubble and the new bubble independently. Gal´ı (2014) assumes that the new
bubble {Ut} is an exogenously given IID process. We consider the more general case in which {Ut}
is serially correlated. Gal´ı (2014) also considers the innovation in the old bubble Bt − Et−1Bt as
another independent source of uncertainty. We will show below that this is true for the sunspot
equilibria. Except for these two sources of uncertainty, there is no other shock in the model.
2.2 Multiple Equilibria
We first present Gal´ı’s results in the deterministic case where Ut = U > 0 for all t. Then the old
bubble {Bt} satisfies the difference equation
Bt+1 =
(1− 1/M) (Bt + U)
β/M− (1 + β)Bt − U
≡ H (Bt, U) . (11)
The necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a deterministic bubbly steady state is
given by
M < 1 + β. (12)
Furthermore, when this condition is satisfied there exists a continuum of stable bubbly steady states
indexed by U , {
(Bs (U) , U) : Bs (U) = H (Bs (U) , U) for U ∈
(
0, U¯
)}
,
and a continuum of unstable bubbly steady states also indexed by U,
{
(Bu (U) , U) : Bu (U) = H (Bu (U) , U) for U ∈ [0, U¯ ), Bu (U) > Bs(U)
}
,
where
U¯ = β + (1 + β) (1−W )− 2
√
β (1 + β) (1−W ) > 0 and W =
1
M
.
The economy also has a bubbleless steady state in which B = U = 0. In this steady state we
can show the bubbleless real interest rate is Rf = (M− 1) /β. Thus condition (12) is the same
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as Rf < 1, which is the standard condition in the literature (Tirole (1985)), i.e., the bubbleless
equilibrium is dynamically inefficient.
Next we study the stochastic case by log-linearizing the equilibrium system around a determin-
istic bubbly steady state for a fixed U ∈
(
0, U¯
)
. In Appendix A we show that the log-linearized
equilibrium system can be reduced to a unidimensional system
bt =
1
R(φb + 1)
Etbt+1 +
φb − ǫB(1 + β)
φb + 1
Et−1bt (13)
+
R− 1
R
ut +
(ǫB − φb)(R− 1)
(φb + 1)R
Et−1ut,
where we use a lower case variable to denote the log deviation from its steady-state value and R
denotes the bubbly steady-state real interest rate given by
R =
1
β
1− 1/M+B
1/M−B
=
B
B + U
∈ (0, 1) .
Note that there are two bubbly steady states for a fixed U ∈
(
0, U¯
)
. Without risk of confusion, we
use the same notation B to represent either one of the steady-state size of the old bubble in the
analysis below.
Our objective is to solve for a rational expectations equilibrium (REE) using (13). Gal´ı (2014)
assumes that ut is IID. We consider a more general AR(1) process
ut = ρut−1 + et, ρ ∈ [0, 1), (14)
where et is an IID random variable with mean zero and variance σ
2
e .
Gal´ı (2014) focuses his analysis on a sunspot solution around a stable bubbly steady state.
Given (14), we can derive the following more general solution. Its proof and the proofs of the
remaining propositions in the paper are given in Appendix B.
Proposition 1 Fix U ∈
(
0, U¯
)
. For any b0, there is a linear sunspot solution in a neighborhood of
the bubbly stable steady state given by
bt = χbt−1 + (1−R) (1 + ǫB) ρut−2 + ϕ
∗
2et + ϕ
∗
3et−1 + ϕ
∗
4ξt + ϕ
∗
5ξt−1,
where ξt denotes a sunspot shock satisfying Et−1ξt = 0, ϕ
∗
3 and ϕ
∗
5 are arbitrary real numbers, and
ϕ∗2 =
ϕ∗3 + (R− 1) (1 + φb)
R (φb + 1)− χ
, ϕ∗4 =
ϕ∗5
R(φb + 1)− χ
,
χ = R (1 + ǫB (1 + β)) ∈ (0, 1).
Gal´ı (2014) shows that χ = ∂H (B,U) /∂B. For a stable bubbly steady state, we must have
χ ∈ (0, 1) , which also implies that the backward-looking solution in Proposition 1 is stationary.
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Gal´ı (2014) defines a sunspot variable ξt = bt − Et−1bt. Substituting this variable into (13) yields
a particular solution
bt = χbt−1 + (φb + 1) (1−R)ut−1 − (φb − ǫB)(1−R)ρut−2 (15)
+ξt + (φb − ǫB (1 + β))Rξt−1,
which can also be obtained by setting
ϕ∗2 = 0, ϕ
∗
3 = (1−R) (1 + φb) , ϕ
∗
5 = (φb − ǫB (1 + β))R
in our general solution given in Proposition 1. The solution in equation (30) of Gal´ı (2014) corre-
sponds to ρ = 0 in (15).
For this solution, the initial value b0 is indeterminate. Gal´ı (2014) derives all his results for a
fixed b0. From (15) we can see that monetary policy only affects the anticipated component of the
old bubble Et−1bt through the interest rate coefficient φb. In the case of ρ = 0, Gal´ı (2014) shows
that a leaning-against-the-wind policy which corresponds to φb > 0 generates a larger volatility in
the bubble than a policy of benign neglect (φb = 0).
Now we consider the solution in the neighborhood of the unstable bubbly steady state.
Proposition 2 Fix U ∈
(
0, U¯
)
. There is a unique forward-looking linear solution in a neighborhood
of the unstable bubbly steady state given by
bt = (R− 1)
ǫB + 1
χ− ρ
ρut−1 +
R− 1
R
[
ρ
1 + φb
1 + ǫB
χ− ρ
+ 1
]
et, (16)
where χ = R (1 + ǫB (1 + β)) > 1.
In a neighborhood of the unstable bubbly steady state, we have χ > 1. The backward-looking
solution in (15) is not stationary. We must solve for bt forward to obtain the forward-looking
solution in (16) so that bt is stationary. This solution is also called the minimal state variable
(MSV) solution in the literature (e.g., Evans and Honkapohja (2001)). In the next section we will
focus our analysis on this solution.
Note that if ρ = 0 as in Gal´ı (2014), then the MSV solution gives bt = et (R− 1) /R. In this
case monetary policy through φb does not affect bubble dynamics. We thus assume ρ ∈ (0, 1)
throughout the paper.
2.3 Learning and Equilibrium Selection
There are multiple (deterministic) steady states and multiple REE solutions in Gal´ı (2014). We
will use learning as a selection device to select a particular steady state and a particular REE
solution. To understand the basic idea, we consider an economic model with a solution described
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as a particular parameter vector ϕ¯ (e.g., the parameters of an autoregressive process or a steady
state). Under adaptive learning agents do not know ϕ¯ but estimate it from data using a statistical
procedure such as least squares. This leads to estimates ϕt at time t and the question is whether
ϕt → ϕ¯ as t→∞. Evans and Honkapohja (2001) show that, for a wide range of economic examples
and learning rules, convergence is governed by the corresponding E-stability condition, i.e., the
local asymptotic stability of ϕ¯ under the differential equation
dϕ
dτ
= T (ϕ)− ϕ, (17)
where τ denotes notional or virtual time, T (ϕ) is the mapping from the perceived law of motion
(PLM) ϕ to the implied actual law of motion (ALM) T (ϕ). In the following analysis we will check
the E-stability condition.
We start by the steady states.
Proposition 3 For any fixed U ∈
(
0, U¯
)
, the bubbly unstable steady state Pareto dominates the
bubbly stable steady state. Moreover the bubbly unstable steady state is E-stable if and only if
φb > −1 and the bubbly stable steady state is E-stable if and only if φb < −1.
2
Next we consider the stochastic MSV and sunspot solutions.
Proposition 4 For φb > −1 the sunspot solution in Proposition 1 is not E-stable. The MSV
solution in Proposition 2 is E-stable if and only if φb > −1.
Gal´ı (2014) shows that the optimal response coefficient φb that minimizes the welfare loss is
greater than −1 for the sunspot solution. Proposition 4 shows that this solution under the optimal
policy is not E-stable. By contrast, the MSV solution for φb > −1 is E-stable. In the next section
we will show that the optimal coefficient φb is positive for the MSV solution and hence the MSV
solution under optimal monetary policy is E-stable.
3 Monetary Policy
What is the impact of the monetary policy on bubble dynamics? We first use (16) to compute the
volatility of the old bubble
V ar (bt) =
(
ǫB + 1
χ− ρ
ρ
)2 (R− 1)2σ2e
1− ρ2
+
(
R− 1
R
)2 [ ρ
1 + φb
1 + ǫB
χ− ρ
+ 1
]2
σ2e .
It is minimized at
φb = −
ρ(1 + ǫB)
χ− ρ
− 1 < 0. (18)
2In a previous version of the paper, we started with the deterministic system (11) directly. The PLM is Bt+1 = a
and ALM is T (a) = H−1 (a, U) . The ODE is a˙ = T (a)− a. In this case the assumption on φb is not needed.
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Gal´ı (2014) shows that the volatility of both the old and aggregate bubbles is minimized at φb = −1
for his sunspot solution.
Now we log-linearize equation (6) to obtain
qt = Rbt + (1−R) ut (19)
and combine it with (16) to derive the volatility of the aggregate bubble for our MSV solution:
V ar (qt) = (R− 1)
2
[
R
ǫB + 1
χ− ρ
− 1
]2
ρ2(1− ρ2)−1σ2e +
[
(R− 1) ρ
1 + φb
1 + ǫB
χ− ρ
]2
σ2e .
Thus a leaning-against-the-wind policy (i.e., φb > 0) generates a lower volatility of the aggregate
bubble than a policy of benign neglect (φb = 0), contrary to Gal´ı’s result. The volatility is minimized
when φb → +∞. Interestingly, when φb decreases to negative infinity, the bubble volatility also
decreases to zero. However, since in this case the MSV solution is E-unstable, the adaptive learning
perspective argues against the relevance of this case: restriction attention to values of φb for which
the solution is learnable, increasing φb reduces bubble volatility.
The results above show that the volatilities of the old and aggregate bubbles are proportional to
the volatility of new bubble innovations, which are the only source of uncertainty. By contrast, for
the sunspot solution in Gal´ı (2014) (see (15) here), innovations in old bubbles are another source
of uncertainty that can drive the movements of the aggregate bubble independent of fundamentals.
This is an appealing feature, though both sources of uncertainty are not observable and hardly
testable.
Figure 1 presents the relation between φb and the volatilities of the old and aggregate bubbles
for the MSV solution. We choose the same parameter values as in Gal´ı (2014) by setting β = 1,
ǫ = 6, U = 0.175. These values imply Bs = 0.1, Bu = 0.1458, and M = 1.2. While Gal´ı (2014)
studies equilibria around the stable bubbly steady state Bs = 0.1, we focus on the solution around
the unstable bubbly steady state Bu = 0.1458. Gal´ı’s result is illustrated in Figure 2 of his paper,
which shows that the bubble volatility increases with φb > 0.
To understand the intuition behind Figure 1, we consider the economy’s responses to an ex-
ogenous positive bubble shock to ut. We first use equations (2), (6), (7), and (8) to derive the
log-linearized asset pricing equation
qt = Etbt+1 − rt, (20)
which says that total bubble is equal to the future old bubble discounted by rt. Using this equation
and (19), we see that the old bubble satisfies the asset pricing equation
bt =
1
R
Etbt+1 −
1
R
rt −
(1−R)
R
ut. (21)
Solving forward shows that the old bubble is equal to the (negative) discounted value of future
real interest rates and new bubbles. Since 0 < R < 1, new bubbles {ut} act as negative dividends.
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Figure 1: Monetary Policy and Bubble Volatility
Note: This figure plots the standard deviations of the aggregate bubble qt and old bubble bt for various coefficients
φb. The vertical line indicates the value of φb that minimizes the standard deviation of the old bubble. The parameter
values are β = 1, ǫ = 6, U = 0.175, φπ = 2, ρ = 0.8, and σ
2
e = 0.01. We focus on the unstable bubbly steady state
with B = 0.1458.
An increase in ut has a direct effect of lowering bt and an indirect effect through the change in
the interest rate rt. Due to the endogenous response of rt, a unique forward-looking solution for bt
exists as shown in Proposition 2, even when 0 < R < 1. In contrast to Gal´ı (2014), bt is a jump
variable and responds to shocks on impact like any asset prices.
The impact of monetary policy on asset bubbles qt and bt is transmitted through the real interest
rate rt, which in turn depends on the size of bubbles bt. Thus we need to understand the dynamic
responses of rt for different values of φb. In Appendix C we show that
rt = (R − 1)
[
(ǫB + 1)(ρ −R)
χ− ρ
+ 1
]
ρut−1 +
φbρ(R− 1)(ǫB + 1)
(φb + 1)(χ− ρ)
et. (22)
When ρ = 0, rt = 0 and bt = et (R− 1) /R by Proposition 2. It follows from (20) that qt = 0. The
intuition is that the impact of a positive new bubble shock on the aggregate bubble is exactly offset
by a negative response of the old bubble so that the size of the aggregate bubble does not change.
Thus the value of φb does not affect the real interest rate by the monetary policy rule in (10) and
hence it does not affect bubble dynamics.
Figure 2 presents the impulse response functions for {bt} , {qt} , {rt} , and {πt} given a 1% shock
to e0 in period 0 for ρ = 0.8. When monetary policy does not respond to bubbles (φb = 0), a positive
shock to expand the new bubble u0 at date 0 crowds out the size of old bubbles b0 and dampens
the aggregate bubble q0, but r0 does not change, as shown in equations (16), (19), and (22).
When φb > 0, the central bank will cut the interest rate according to the interest rate rule as
q0 and b0 decline and hence the fall of the old and aggregate bubbles is mitigated by (21). For this
channel to work we need ρ ∈ (0, 1) so that the term related to et in (22) is negative as R ∈ (0, 1)
and χ > 1. Both ρ > 0 and the forward-looking solution (initial changes of aggregate bubbles) are
important for a leaning-against-the-wind policy to lower bubble volatility in response to a bubble
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shock e0. For a larger φb > 0, the mitigation effect is stronger so that aggregate and old bubbles
respond less to the bubble shock. This explains why the volatilities of qt and bt decrease with
φb > 0 as illustrated in Figure 1.
By contrast, for Gal´ı’s backward-looking solution, we rewrite (21) as
bt+1 = Rbt + rt + (1−R)ut + ξt+1,
where ξt = bt − Et−1bt is a sunspot shock and b0 is predetermined. Either a positive bubble shock
or a positive sunspot shock raises the size of future bubbles without changing the initial size b0.
A leaning-against-the-wind policy with φb > 0 will raise the interest rate rt so that future bubbles
will grow even faster. This explains why such a policy will raise bubble volatility in Gal´ı (2014).
For our forward-looking solution, Figure 2 shows that qt and bt fall on impact and then gradually
rise to their steady state values. Their dynamics for different values of φb differ only in the initial
period. This can be seen from equations (16), (19), and (22) because R ∈ (0, 1) , et = 0 for t > 0,
and ut is an AR(1) process with persistence ρ > 0. The effect of φb is only on the terms related to
the temporary shock et.
When φb < 0, the old and aggregate bubbles may rise on impact in response to a positive
bubble shock. When the central bank cuts the interest rate to encourage bubbles, this effect may
dominate the direct negative effect of the rise in the new bubble on the old bubble as shown in
equation (21). As shown in Figure 2, when φb decreases from −2 to −5, the old and aggregate
bubbles are dampened and the fall of interest rate is also mitigated. If bubbles expanded, the
central bank would cut the interest rate more, which in turn would encourage bubbles further.
This positive feedback effect might make the bubble explode.
Since firms adjust prices one period in advance before shocks are realized, the inflation rate πt
is predetermined. Thus it does not respond to the bubble shock on impact. As shown in Figure 2,
it may rise or fall in the second period depending on the value of φb. In Appendix C we show that
the inflation rate around the unstable bubbly steady state is given by
πt =
ρ(R− 1)[ρ(ǫB + 1) + (1 + φb)(βǫBR− ρ)]
φπ(χ− ρ)
ut−1.
If φb = 0, the inflation rate falls in the second period because R ∈ (0, 1) and χ > 1. The central
bank can stabilize inflation by two strategies: First, it can set φπ at an arbitrary large value and set
φb at a finite value. Second, it can set φπ at a finite value and set φb = ρ(ǫB+1)/ (ρ− βǫBR)− 1.
In Gal´ı’s (2014) model inflation is not a source of welfare losses given synchronized price-setting
and an inelastic labor supply. Thus it is not optimal for the central bank to stabilize inflation.
To study optimal monetary policy, we follow Gal´ı (2014) to take the unconditional mean of an
agent’s lifetime utility as a welfare criterion. In a neighborhood of a steady state, we can derive
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Figure 2: Impulse Responses to A New Bubble Shock
Note: This figure plots the impulse response functions for a one percent positive new bubble shock, in percentage
deviation from the steady state. The parameter values are β = 1, ǫ = 6, U = 0.175, φπ = 2, ρ = 0.8, and σ
2
e = 0.01.
We focus on the unstable bubbly steady state with B = 0.1458.
the second-order approximation to the mean:
E [lnC1,t + β lnC2,t+1] ≃ lnC1 + β lnC2 −
1
2
(V ar (c1,t) + V ar (c2,t)) .
By the resource constraint C1,t+C2,t = 1, V ar (c1,t) is proportional to V ar (c2,t) . Thus the optimal
monetary policy that maximizes welfare will minimize the variance of
c2,t = (1− Γ) dt + Γbt,
where Γ = ǫB/(ǫB + 1).
In Appendix C we show that
dt =
χ(R− 1)[φb (ρ− ǫBβR)− ǫB(βR+ ρ)]
βR2(1 + φb)(χ− ρ)
et.
Thus minimizing the volatility of dividends calls for setting
φb =
ǫB (βR+ ρ)
ǫBβR− ρ
.
However this policy would raise the volatility of the old bubble because it is minimized at a different
value given in (18). Thus optimal monetary policy trades off between the volatility of dividends
and the volatility of the old bubble.
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Note that bt and dt are also correlated. In Appendix C we derive that
V ar(c2,t) =
(
ǫBρ(R− 1)
χ− ρ
)2
(1− ρ2)−1σ2e +
[
(R− 1)ρ(φb − ǫB)
βR(1 + φb)(χ− ρ)
]2
σ2e .
From this equation we can show that the optimal coefficient is given by φb = ǫB > 0 for ρ 6= 0. Thus
the leaning-against-the-wind policy is optimal. Moreover the optimal coefficient increases with the
size of the bubble. This property is in contrast with Figure 4 of Gal´ı (2014), which shows that the
optimal coefficient φb is positive for a small size of bubbles and becomes negative for a sufficiently
large size of bubbles.
Figure 3 illustrates the relation between φb and V ar (c2,t) . The welfare loss is minimized at
φb = 0.875.
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Figure 3: Monetary Policy and Welfare
Note: This figure plots the standard deviations of dividend dt and consumption of the old c2,t for various values of
φb. The vertical lines indicate the values of φb that minimize the standard deviation of consumption and dividend
respectively. The parameter values are β = 1, ǫ = 6, U = 0.175, φπ = 2, ρ = 0.8, and σ
2
e = 0.01. We focus on the
unstable bubbly steady state with B = 0.1458.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we have shown that Gal´ı’s (2014) counterintuitive results are driven by his choice of
a backward-looking sunspot solution around a stable bubbly steady state. His model also features
a continuum of unstable bubbly steady states, which Pareto dominate the corresponding stable
bubbly steady states. We extend his model to incorporate persistent bubble shocks. When deriving
the unique forward-looking MSV solution around an unstable bubbly steady state, we obtain results
that are consistent with the conventional views. We apply learning as a selection device to select
steady state and equilibrium. We find that the unstable bubbly steady state and the associated
MSV equilibrium are E-stable under optimal monetary policy. But the stable bubbly steady state
and the associated sunspot equilibrium are not E-stable under optimal monetary policy.
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In an infinite-horizon framework without recurrent creation of new bubbles, Miao and Wang
(2018) prove that the economy has two steady states. The local equilibrium around the bubbly
steady state is unique and the local equilibrium around the bubbleless steady state is indeterminate
of degree one. We conjecture that learning will select the bubbly steady state and the associated
forward-looking solution as in this paper. Miao, Wang, and Xu (2015) and Dong, Miao, and
Wang (2017) incorporate recurrent bubbles and show that the economy has a continuum of bubbly
steady states as in Gal´ı (2014). However, they are unable to prove the stability of these steady states
analytically due to the complexity of their multi-dimensional equilibrium systems. In contrast to
Gal´ı (2014), their numerical results indicate that each bubbly steady state is a saddle point and
the local equilibrium around each bubbly steady state is unique. We suspect that the difference in
results may be due to the difference in the infinite-horizon and overlapping-generations frameworks.
Further theoretical research is needed to understand this issue.
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Appendix
A Deriving Equilibrium Bubble Dynamics
As in Gal´ı’ (2014), the log-linearize equilibrium system consists equations (19), (20), and
0 = c1,t + βRc2,t, (A.1)
c1,t = Etc2,t+1 − rt, (A.2)
c2,t = (1− Γ)dt + Γbt, (A.3)
Et−1wt = Et−1dt = 0, (A.4)
rt = φππt + φbqt. (A.5)
Combining (A.1), (A.2), and (A.3) we derive
rt = (1− Γ)Etdt+1 + ΓEtbt+1 + βR((1− Γ)dt + Γbt)
= ΓEtbt+1 + βR((1− Γ)dt + Γbt),
where we have used Etdt+1 = 0 by (A.4) in the second equality.
Combining the equation above with (19) and (20) yields
rt = Γ(rt +Rbt + (1−R)ut) + βR((1 − Γ)dt + Γbt).
We substitute Γ = ǫB/(ǫB + 1) into the equation above to obtain
rt = ǫBR(1 + β)bt + ǫB(1−R)ut + βRdt. (A.6)
Taking expectations conditional on information at time t− 1 yields
Et−1rt = ǫBR(1 + β)Et−1bt + ǫB(1−R)Et−1ut, (A.7)
where we have used Et−1dt = 0. We use equation (A.7) and interest rate rule (A.5) to derive
rt − Et−1rt = φπ(πt − Et−1πt) + φb(qt − Et−1qt)
= φb(qt − Et−1qt)
= φbR(bt − Et−1bt) + φb(1−R)(ut − Et−1ut), (A.8)
where the second equality follows from πt = Et−1πt due to price stickiness and we use (19) to
substitute for qt to derive the third equality.
Using (A.7) and (A.8) we derive
rt = rt −Et−1rt + Et−1rt
= φbRbt + (ǫB(1 + β)− φb)REt−1bt + φb(1−R)ut + (ǫB − φb)(1−R)Et−1ut.
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Now we substitute the equation above into (20) and use (19) to derive
Etbt+1 = Rbt + (1−R)ut
+ φbRbt − (φb − ǫB(1 + β))REt−1bt + φb(1−R)ut − (φb − ǫB)(1−R)Et−1ut
= (φb + 1)Rbt − (φb − ǫB(1 + β))REt−1bt + (φb + 1)(1 −R)ut − (φb − ǫB)(1−R)Et−1ut.
We then obtain (13). Q.E.D.
B Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: Conjecture that the solution takes the form
bt = ϕ0bt−1 + ϕ1ut−2 + ϕ2et + ϕ3et−1 + ϕ4ξt + ϕ5ξt−1,
where ϕ0, ϕ1, ϕ2, ϕ3, ϕ4, and ϕ5 are coefficients to be determined. Substituting this solution into
(13) yields
bt =
1
R(φb + 1)
[ϕ0bt + ϕ1ut−1 + ϕ3et + ϕ5ξt]
+
φb − ǫB(1 + β)
φb + 1
(ϕ0bt−1 + ϕ1ut−2 + ϕ3et−1 + ϕ5ξt−1)
+
R− 1
R
(ρut−1 + et) +
(ǫB − φb)(R− 1)
(φb + 1)R
ρut−1.
That is,
bt =
1
R(φb + 1)
[ϕ0 (ϕ0bt−1 + ϕ1ut−2 + ϕ2et + ϕ3et−1 + ϕ4ξt + ϕ5ξt−1)
+ϕ1 (ρut−2 + et−1) + ϕ3et + ϕ5ξt]
+
φb − ǫB(1 + β)
φb + 1
(ϕ0bt−1 + ϕ1ut−2 + ϕ3et−1 + ϕ5ξt−1)
+
R− 1
R
(
ρ2ut−2 + ρet−1 + et
)
+
(ǫB − φb)(R− 1)
(φb + 1)R
(
ρ2ut−2 + ρet−1
)
.
Using the conjectured form for bt again and matching coefficients, we obtain
ϕ0 =
1
R(φb + 1)
ϕ20 +
φb − ǫB(1 + β)
φb + 1
ϕ0, (B.1)
ϕ1 =
1
R(φb + 1)
(ϕ0ϕ1 + ρϕ1) +
φb − ǫB(1 + β)
φb + 1
ϕ1 +
R− 1
R
ρ2 +
(ǫB − φb)(R − 1)
(φb + 1)R
ρ2, (B.2)
ϕ2 =
1
R(φb + 1)
(ϕ0ϕ2 + ϕ3) +
R− 1
R
, (B.3)
ϕ3 =
1
R(φb + 1)
(ϕ0ϕ3 + ϕ1) +
φb − ǫB(1 + β)
φb + 1
ϕ3 +
R− 1
R
ρ+
(ǫB − φb)(R− 1)
(φb + 1)R
ρ, (B.4)
ϕ4 =
1
R(φb + 1)
(ϕ0ϕ4 + ϕ5) , (B.5)
ϕ5 =
1
R(φb + 1)
ϕ0ϕ5 +
φb − ǫB(1 + β)
φb + 1
. (B.6)
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There are two solutions for ϕ0 : ϕ0 = 0 and
ϕ0 = χ = R (1 + ǫB (1 + β)) .
In a neighborhood of the stable bubbly steady state, we have χ ∈ (0, 1). The only stationary
solution must corresponds to ϕ0 = χ as Gal´ı (2014) points out. We can then solve for the other
coefficients:
ϕ1 = (1−R) (1 + ǫB) ρ, ϕ2 =
ϕ3 + (R− 1) (1 + φb)
R (φb + 1)− χ
, ϕ4 =
ϕ5
R(φb + 1)− χ
,
and ϕ3 and ϕ5 are arbitrary numbers. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: We take expectations conditional on information at time t−1 on both
sides of (13) to obtain
Et−1bt
[
1−
φb − ǫB(1 + β)
φb + 1
]
=
1
R(φb + 1)
Et−1bt+1
+
[
R− 1
R
+
(ǫB − φb)(R − 1)
(φb + 1)R
]
ρut−1.
This implies that
Et−1bt =
1
R[1 + ǫB(1 + β)]
Et−1bt+1 −
(1−R)(ǫB + 1)
R(1 + ǫB(1 + β))
ρut−1.
By iterating the equation above forward we can derive
Et−1bt = −
(1−R)(ǫB + 1)
R(1 + ǫB(1 + β))
(
1
1− ρ/R[1 + ǫB(1 + β)]
)
ρut−1
= −
(1−R)(ǫB + 1)
χ− ρ
ρut−1,
under the condition χ ≡ R[1 + ǫB(1 + β)] > 1. Therefore we also have
Etbt+1 = −
(1−R)(ǫB + 1)
χ− ρ
ρut = −
(1−R)(ǫB + 1)
χ− ρ
(ρ2ut−1 + ρet).
Substituting the preceding expressions for Etbt+1 and Et−1bt into (13), we obtain the rational
expectations solution in (16). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3: We use lifetime utility as the welfare criterion. Define the steady state
welfare as
Wf ≡ ln(C1) + β ln(C2),
where C1 and C2 denote the steady-state consumption of a consumer in his young and old. In a
steady state we have C1 = 1/M−B and C2 = 1− 1/M+B. Therefore
Wf = ln(
1
M
−B) + β ln(1−
1
M
+B).
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We can compute
∂Wf
∂B
=
( 1M −
1
1+β
)−B
C1C2(1 + β)
.
Denote B∗ ≡ 1/M−1/(1+β). Note that B∗ > 0 under the conditionM < 1+β. This implies that
welfare is increasing with B when B < B∗. As shown in Gal´ı (2014) Lemma 1, for any U ∈ (0, U¯ )
the model has two bubbly steady states. Moreover the stable one Bs is always less than the unstable
one Bu. Thus to show the welfare is greater at Bu than at Bs, it suffices to show that Bu < B
∗.
Since Bu is the larger root of equation H(B,U) = B, we have
Bu =
−(1 + U − 1+βM ) +
√
(1 + U − 1+βM )
2 − 4(1 + β)(1 − 1M)U
2(1 + β)
.
Therefore
Bu −B
∗ =
(1− U − 1+βM ) +
√
(1 + U − 1+βM )
2 − 4(1 + β)(1 − 1M)U
2(1 + β)
.
Note that 1− U − 1+βM < 0 by (12). To show Bu < B
∗, it suffices to show that
(1− U −
1 + β
M
)2 > (1 + U −
1 + β
M
)2 − 4(1 + β)(1−
1
M
)U.
This inequality is equivalent to 4(1 + β)U > 4U, which holds true since U, β > 0.
To study E-stability, we rewrite (13) in a general form
bt = β0Et−1bt + β1Etbt+1 + γ0ut + γ1ut−1, (B.7)
where
β0 =
φb − ǫB(1 + β)
φb + 1
, β1 =
1
R(φb + 1)
,
γ0 =
R− 1
R
, γ1 =
ρ(ǫB − φb)(R− 1)
(φb + 1)R
.
We can check that χ ≡ R(1 + ǫB(1 + β)) = β−1
1
(1 − β0). Suppose that the PLM is bt = a.
Set Et−1bt = Etbt+1 = a and ut = ut−1 = 0. Then the ALM is bt = T (a) = (β0 + β1) a. By
Evans and Honkaphja (2001), the E-stability condition for the steady state a = 0 given the ODE
a˙ = T (a)−a = (β0 + β1) a−a is β0+β1 < 1. Since χ > 1 for the unstable bubbly steady state and
χ ∈ (0, 1) for the stable bubbly steady state, we immediately establish the proposition. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4: We start with the MSV solution. We write the PLM as
bt = µ+ ϕ1ut−1 + ϕ2et,
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where we include a constant term µ. Stability under learning requires µ convergence of µ to zero.
Plugging this equation into (B.7) we obtain the ALM with the map T (µ,ϕ1, ϕ2) . By Evans and
Honkapohja (2001), the E-stability condition is
β0 + β1 < 1, β0 + β1ρ < 1. (B.8)
Using the definition in the proof of Proposition 3, we have
β0 + β1 =
1 +Rφb −RǫB(1 + β)
R(φb + 1)
= 1 +
1− χ
R(φb + 1)
,
β0 + ρβ1 =
ρ+Rφb −RǫB(1 + β)
R(φb + 1)
= 1 +
ρ− χ
R(φb + 1)
.
Since χ > 1 at the unstable bubbly steady state, the E-stability condition for the MSV solution is
φb > −1.
Now we consider the backward sunspot solution. We write PLM as
bt = µ+ ϕ1bt−1 + ϕ2ut−1 + ϕ3et + ϕ4et−1 + ϕ5ξt + ϕ6ξt−1.
Plugging this equation into (B.7) we obtain the ALM with the T−map. By Evans and Honkapohja
(2001), the E-stability condition is β0 > 1, β1 < 0. Also the stationarity of the solution requires
|β−1
1
(1−β0)| < 1. In terms of our model parameters, the E-stability condition is φb < −1. Q.E.D.
C Deriving MSV Equilibrium
From Proposition 2 we have the forward-looking MSV solution for the old bubble:
bt =
(R− 1)(ǫB + 1)
χ− ρ
ρut−1 +
R− 1
R
[
ρ(ǫB + 1)
(φb + 1)(χ− ρ)
+ 1
]
et. (C.1)
We use this solution to derive solutions for other variables in the model. By (19) we obtain the
solution for qt:
qt = Rbt + (1−R)ut
= (1−R)
[
1−
R(ǫB + 1)
χ− ρ
]
ρut−1 + (R − 1)
[
ρ(1 + ǫB)
(φb + 1)(χ − ρ)
]
et. (C.2)
By (20) we obtain the solution for rt:
rt = Etbt+1 − qt
= (R − 1)
[
(ǫB + 1)(ρ −R)
χ− ρ
+ 1
]
ρut−1 +
φbρ(R− 1)(ǫB + 1)
(φb + 1)(χ− ρ)
et. (C.3)
By (A.5) we obtain the solution for πt:
πt =
(R− 1)[(ǫB + 1)ρ+ (φb + 1)(ǫBRβ − ρ)]
φπ(χ− ρ)
ρut−1.
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Substituting (C.3) and (C.1) into (A.6) we obtain the solution for dt:
dt =
χ(R − 1)[φbρ− ǫB(βR(1 + φb) + ρ)]
βR2(1 + φb)(χ− ρ)
et.
By (A.3) we obtain the solution for c2,t:
c2,t = (1− Γ)dt + Γbt
=
ǫBρ(R− 1)
χ− ρ
ut−1 +
ρ(R− 1)(φb − ǫB)
βR(1 + φb)(χ− ρ)
et. (C.4)
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